Global Value Chains

Industrializing through global value chains? The case of the South African automotive industry

17/01/2022

When trying to come up with lessons for developing countries that want to industrialize today, people usually refer back to the success of East Asia. But 40 years have passed since South Korea and Taiwan industrialized through exporting and import substitution. Countries trying to industrialize today face a world of globally fragmented production, a world of global value chains (GVCs). The question that has come to the forefront both in academic discussions as well as in policy circles is whether GVC participation can deliver for low-income countries what exporting did for South Korea and Taiwan. South Africa’s integration into the automotive GVC over the past 25 years makes for an interesting case study to shed some light on this question. The development of the South African auto industry has been a story of success and failure at the same time, not least because of the difficulties associated with industrializing in a world of GVCs.

South Africa is the only country in Africa, next to Morocco, that has an automotive industry worth speaking of. It produces 600,000 cars per year, 70% of which are exported, 3 out of 4 of them to Europe. The South African Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition consistently implemented an automotive industrial policy that provided investment support to the foreign-owned automotive assemblers and later support to foreign and locally owned component manufacturers as well. These industrial policies made support for foreign direct investment in the sector conditional on auto assemblers exporting cars and on using some degree of local content.

On the surface, the South African government seems to have followed the industrial policy playbook of the developmental states of the second half of the 20th Century, as illustrated by Alice Amsden. However, the automotive industry has failed to play the role of a leading sector for economic development that it did in South Korea and Taiwan. This is because South Africa’s industry lacks locally owned firms participating at the technological frontier in the industry and it lacks significant linkages with other industries in the country. These limitations result from insufficient industrial policy to support local firms and from the ways in which the automotive global value chain has evolved since the 1990s.

*Volkswagen South Africa Plant in Uitenhage, Eastern Cape*

The automotive industry in South Africa makes up 6-7% of the country’s GDP, roughly a quarter of manufacturing output, and employs more than 100,000 people in vehicle and component production. There are three automotive hubs in the country: Gauteng with Ford, Nissan and BMW; the Eastern Cape with VW, Mercedes-Benz and Isuzu; and Durban with Toyota. In addition to the assemblers, South Africa has attracted investment by many of the largest multinational component suppliers, such as Continental, ZF, Bosch, MA Automotive, Dana Spicer, Benteler, etc. There are also around 200 locally owned component manufacturing firms engaged in the automotive value chain.

*Passenger vehicle assemblers in South Africa (Source: NAAMSA)*

The automotive industry has lots of potential for backward linkages. A car is made of 10,000 different parts, from various materials – steel, aluminium, plastics, glass, leather, textiles, rubber. Automotive production is characterized by just-in-time (JIT) and just-in-sequence (JIS) requirements, which means that some local footprint is always established once volumes go beyond pure kit assembly. But on the other hand, the automotive GVC is also characterized by follow design and follow sourcing, meaning, for example, that Volkswagen designs their car in Wolfsburg, produces that exact car in its plants all over the world without much local design adaptation, and asks its established large suppliers from developed countries to set up subsidiaries next to its plants in developing country locations to fulfil the JIT and JIS requirements.

This used to be different. Up to the late 1980s, cars were locally designed, and significant and distinct local supplier networks supplied materials and parts to the automotive assemblers in developing countries. This situation has been superseded by the almost total ubiquity of the ‘global car’, with follow design and follow sourcing, since the 1990s. In the case of South Africa, in the early 1990s, several of the assemblers and most of the component firms were partially or fully locally owned. This had already changed by the mid-2000s with all seven assemblers as well as many of the component firms being in full foreign ownership.

The automotive assemblers in South Africa do not undertake local R&D. They assemble vehicles that have been designed in their R&D headquarters. The same is true for multinational component suppliers. In addition to that, none of the locally owned supplier firms in South Africa conduct their own design or product development. Instead, they produce subcomponents based on design drawings either from the assemblers directly or from subsidiaries of multinational suppliers also operating in South Africa. The most common components that locally owned firms produce are plastic injection mouldings, metal pressings, and trim components. The total lack of local R&D is very concerning, given the historical importance of the development of innovation capabilities in local companies in successful catch-up industrializers. It is not unique to South Africa. As Richard Doner and colleagues show in their recent book on the automotive industry, not even Thailand – which has an auto industry more than three times the size of South Africa – has managed to develop local R&D capabilities.

*Plastic moulded component (Principle Plastics); metal pressed component (CRH); trim component (Acoustex).*

Locally owned suppliers in South Africa complain about low-profit margins, difficulties to access funding, excessive demands from their buyers regarding certifications, audits, open-book-costing, and production flexibility. They still decide to service the auto industry because it has high and steady demand, as vehicle exports mean production volumes are much higher than they would be if firms were producing only for the domestic market. Domestic demand for vehicles is limited by low incomes and high inequality and has stagnated since 2008.

Looking further upstream, the backward linkages from automotive assembly and component production to the local material industries in South Africa have also been disappointing. South Africa has a local steel mill, two large local polymer producers, and a local aluminium smelter. Nevertheless, by far the majority of the materials for automotive production are imported. It is a consequence of follow sourcing and the fact that material requirements for automotive are incredibly high. BMW does not use the same polymeric material for a car bumper as Mercedes-Benz does. They all have their own standards, formulations, blends, and intellectual property around this. This hyper-diversity of materials reduces the scale of production and thus makes firm-level investments into the local production of materials less attractive.

The scale of production in the South African automotive industry – albeit exporting 70% of final output – is still insufficient to localize more sophisticated components like engines and electronics, materials production, as well as tooling and machinery (almost all tooling is imported; all machinery is fully imported). In contrast to exports of vehicles, exports of components are low (with the exception of catalytic converters based on locally available platinum-group metals). The government tries to tackle this scale problem. The South African Automotive Masterplan aims at upping vehicle production volumes from 600,000 to 1.4 million by 2035. Whether this can be achieved remains to be seen. It is certainly true that if production volumes could be increased, this would help achieve further localization. Some countries with larger production volumes like Thailand have for example managed to localize the production of engines and transmissions (for a comparison of localization achievements of different countries, see here).

*Ford Ranger on the road in Johannesburg. The pick-ups – locally called bakkies – are the most common vehicle produced in South Africa.*

The South African picture is not unique. The requirements to get some of the historically important elements of industrialization going, like inter-industry linkages and nurturing innovation capabilities in locally owned firms, have increased substantially compared to the time when South Korea and Taiwan started their automotive industries. The gap between incumbents and followers has widened. Doner and his colleagues show that out of the top 100 global automotive suppliers in 2019, only three came from countries other than from Western Europe, the US, Japan, South Korea and China (Motherson from India, Nemak from Mexico and Iochpe-Maxion from Brazil). Incumbent lead firm power in both assembly and component manufacturing is huge. They undertake most R&D and orchestrate global sourcing of materials and components. Other research demonstrates that the denationalization of automotive industries is commonplace across developing countries, see e.g. here and here.

While it has been emphasized in policy circles that the emergence of GVCs has made it easier for developing countries to enter export markets for manufactured goods and led to increases in local firms’ productivity, the case of the automotive GVC illustrates two major limitations of GVC-based industrialization. The potential for the development of inter-industry linkages and innovation capabilities in developing countries participating in the automotive GVC is undermined by excessive incumbent power, follow design, and follow sourcing.

This blog is based on the PhD research carried out by Tobias Wuttke. The PhD project is on the South African automotive industry, researching the technological capabilities of local component manufacturing firms, linkages from the industry to other domestic economic sectors, and the role of industrial policy. Primary data collected throughout 2021 both online and in South Africa includes semi-structured interviews with vehicle assemblers operating in South Africa, materials producers, multinational automotive component manufacturers, locally owned South African automotive component manufacturers, as well as several interviews with policymakers and industry experts. Some of the research was conducted together with Lorenza Monaco of GERPISA, ENS Paris Saclay.

Tobias Wuttke is a Ph.D. Fellow at Roskilde University, Department of Social Sciences and Business.

Lindsay Whitfield is Professor of Business and Development at the Centre for Business and Development Studies, within the Department of Management, Society and Communication at Copenhagen Business School.

Supply Chain Responsibilities in a Global Pandemic

30/04/2020

What is the responsibility of Western retailers to the workers who make their garments as the corona virus forces factories to shut down?

By Jette Steen Knudsen, Erin Leitheiser, Shaidur Rahman & Jeremy Moon

See our recently-released report on the Early Impacts of Coronavirus on the Bangladesh Apparel Supply Chain.

This article has first been published by Business of Society.

Shopping malls are closed, gatherings are banned, thousands of employees have been furloughed, and movement outside of one’s home is discouraged if not outright illegal. This has meant bad news for apparel brands and retailers as nervous customers cease buying. In the U.S., for example, retail sales in March were down almost 9% compared to in February. Those brands and retailers which have built their businesses on a fast fashion model – predicated on the continuous churn of high volumes of cheap clothes – face unprecedented challenges and questions about responsibilities in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Retailers have responded in different ways. As they have had to shut down their stores many have stated that they will not pay rent. For example, German sportswear producer Adidas stated (March 26 200, Reuters) that

“Almost all over the world there is no normal business anymore. The shops are closed. Even a healthy company like Adidas cannot stand this for long”.

Adidas was one of a string of retailers in Germany that said they wouldn’t be paying their landlords while their stores are closed as part of efforts to stem the coronavirus spread. Adidas said it would need credit even after staff cut their working hours, executives waived part of their pay and the company stopped share buybacks. Adidas’ decision was met with an uproar in Germany eventually forcing the company to formally apologize and to report that it planned to suspend a planned 1 billion euro ($1.09 billion) share buyback in an effort conserve cash after closing its retail outlets in Europe and North America. Adidas also said it would pay rent.

In Denmark, Anders Holck Poulsen, the owner of the clothing company Bestseller and Denmark’s wealthiest man, also announced that the company would not pay rent for its stores. Bestseller (parent company for brands like Vera Moda, Jack & Jones, Pieces, and Name It, among others) later reversed the decision following a public outcry and the CEO went on national television to apologize. Bestseller subsequently laid off 750 employees and sought financial support from the government. This decision was met sharp with sharp criticism because over the last five years Mr. Holck Poulsen has paid DKK 7.6 billion (more than $ 1 billion) in dividends to his private holding company Heartland.

Not all companies have responded this way. Patagonia, for example, has promised that all of its employees will continue to receive their regular pay during store closures.

However, with many large brands scaling back their social responsibility in the Western part of the world, what kind of responsibility can we reasonably expect from Western retailers in places such as Bangladesh?

Bangladesh is heavily dependent on apparel production. Apparel comprises more than 80% of the country’s total export revenue and the sector employs more than 4 million workers, most of them women. However, in recent weeks many Western brands have cancelled their orders from Bangladesh, and it is estimated that more than 2 million workers have lost their jobs. H&M is the largest buyer of garments from Bangladesh and has reluctantly agreed to take and pay for the shipments of goods already manufactured as well as those that are still being produced. Inditex, PVH and Marks and Spencer have also agreed to pay suppliers for orders that are already produced but not all companies have done so. Primark, for example, has cancelled orders, and virtually all buyers have pulled orders that have not yet gone into production. At the end of March 2020 orders for more than $1,5 billion had been cancelled, and Bangladesh reported -19% year-on-year export volume for the month.

What is the responsibility of large brands like Bestseller or H&M for their supplier factories in Bangladesh? Western brands have a long tradition for stating their commitment to CSR in global supply chains, including elaborate Codes of Conduct for social and environmental performance in supplier factories. Bangladesh has staked its claim as the low-cost producer of garments, and its costs and production capacities cannot be easily matched elsewhere in the world. The model of fast fashion needs Bangladesh, and Bangladesh, in turn, needs fast fashion.

Now that crisis reigns upon all of us in the form of a global health pandemic, it is the most vulnerable of workers who have been left in the lurch, be it the retails associates who stock shelves or the stitchers who sew together T-shirts. As buyers cancel orders, few recognize the perilous position that these workers are left in. For those working on the factory floor in Bangladesh, more than 2 million have been furloughed, many without pay, despite a governmental scheme intended to address these issues. The meagre wages of garment factory workers have not allowed for savings that could support them in such times, and the prospect of long-term closures – or at least, no orders to fill and therefore no paid work – means almost certain disaster for them and their families.

Garment workers in Bangladesh have risen up in protest, stating that

“…we don’t have any choice. We are starving. If we stay at home, we may save ourselves from the virus. But who will save us from starvation?” (13 April 2020, The Guardian).

While some brands, like Primark, have set up charitable funding pools to help support workers, the money has yet to make it to their pockets, and the “charitable” framing of this funding on behalf of brands speaks volumes about what they see as their responsibilities. Yet, when the crisis passes and shopping malls re-open, brands will again be reliant upon these workers to satisfy their demand for an endless supply of cheap garments.

Given that cheap labor is a fundamental need for fast fashion companies to survive, shouldn’t brands likewise ensure the survival of those on which it depends?

About the authors

Jette Steen Knudsen is Professor of Policy and International Business at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and holds the Shelby Collum Davis Chair in Sustainability. She is also a Velux Fellow at Copenhagen Business School where she is part of the Regulation of International Supply Chains (RISC) project.

Erin Leitheiser is an Assistant Professor at Copenhagen Business School and Project Manager of the Regulation of International Supply Chains (RISC) project.

Shaidur Rahman is Professor of Sociology at BRAC University where he is part of the Regulation of International Supply Chains (RISC) project.

Jeremy Moon is Professor of Sustainability Governance and Director of the Sustainability Centre at Copenhagen Business School. He is the Project Coordinator of the Regulation of International Supply Chains (RISC) project.

We must move beyond ‘green capitalism’

17/01/2020

Big corporations are branding themselves as sustainable. But the capitalist logic of expansion and consumption that make them thrive is the real climate issue, CBS professor claims in a new book.

Stefano Ponte, Professor of International Political Economy and Director, Centre for Business and Development Studies, Copenhagen Business School, spo.msc@cbs.dk

Green growth, corporate social responsibility and sustainability management have become part of the lexicon of business – in Denmark and beyond.

Sustainability competitions and prizes showcase the ‘good work’ that some corporations are doing to address social and environmental concerns, from the global to the local levels.

Many large firms regularly publish sustainability reports to document their commitment to a better future, while reassuring investors that they can achieve positive financial results too. They also require their suppliers (often based in the global South) to improve their own social and environmental practices.

Given this picture, do we need different or additional regulatory interventions and activism to push business to further improve their practices?

Drawing from twenty years of research from the ground up, Stefano Ponte’s new book Business, Power and Sustainability shows in painstaking detail how managing sustainability has become big business.

Yet, climate change, rampant deforestation and loss of biodiversity suggest that corporations are not doing nearly enough to address global sustainability challenges.

Corporations cash in by showcasing eco-efforts

In the name of sustainability, a massive transfer of resources is actually taking place along global value chains – from the global South to the global North, from producers to global buyers and consumers, and from labour to capital.

Global buyers are finding new ways to extract environmental value from their suppliers, making more money for themselves while leaving little impact on sustainability.

The gradual mainstreaming of sustainability that underpins green capitalism has been driven by cost-cutting and eco-efficiency efforts which provide corporations with a ‘business case’ for applying environmental improvements.

Eco-efficiency processes such as decreasing energy and water use, optimizing packaging, and improving recycling often lead to net cost reductions in operations and thus allow a focus on the bottom line – something that became even more urgent following the economic downturn of the late 2000s

Companies like Ikea and Walmart have applied substantial cost-cutting measures on energy consumption, packaging and transport in their own operations, while showcasing these as examples of their ‘commitment to sustainability’.

…at the expense of the Global South

Furthermore, lead firms in global value chains are placing new environmental demands on their suppliers, including requests for more information on supplier cost structures and operations.

This allows buyers, when possible, to squeeze purchasing prices even further, especially in the Global South. When profit margins decrease for suppliers, they negatively affect their economic sustainability and can also have negative rebounding effects on social sustainability – e.g. driving suppliers to cut labour costs or worsen work conditions to recoup the extra environmental costs.

Green capitalism has little interest in actually tackling climate change

But, at the very least, are corporations actually making a difference in addressing global sustainability challenges?

Business, Power and Sustainability shows that sustainability management is at work for green capital, but does not really address environmental challenges. Climate change, rampant deforestation in some parts of the globe, loss of biodiversity, and ocean acidification suggest that current business practice is not enough, that current regulatory instruments are falling short, and that social movements and activism still have a long way to go.

But from the perspective of green capitalism, tackling ever-increasing production and consumption is not a priority. The focus is on how technology and new business models can improve the efficiency of resource use, instead of decreasing the aggregate impact on the Earth and its biosphere.

Furthermore, more efficient extraction and use of natural resources often leads to lower prices and this can prolong and even increase fossil fuel consumption and the extraction rate of natural resources.

And while in the global North economies may be ‘dematerializing’, the use of energy and materials is actually moving to production facilities in the global South rather than decreasing overall.

For things to really change, we must break with the logic of expansion

In other words, while green capital accumulation strategies that optimize resource consumption are helping to lower the relative energy and material intensity of production, they do not address the overall ecological limits to growth because they are based on a logic of continuous expansion.

Technological and organizational fixes, such as cutting energy costs, improving packaging materials, minimizing transport distances, and building green brands credentials, can improve how much energy and resources we use to produce a unit of a product. But this does not necessarily lead to overall reductions when production and consumption continue to rise.

From Anthropocene to Capitalocene

While incremental change is needed, it is not sufficient without a systemic rethinking of the relations between capitalism and nature.

Human activity is having major impact on the earth and its biosphere, to the point that geologists have now defined a new era – the Anthropocene – to reflect this phenomenon.

This entails that the idea of ‘sustainable development’ in the context of green capitalism will not be achieved unless we rethink the current organization of the global economy, reform the economic and political institutions that govern it, and devise new forms of governance and collective action.

As long as sustainability is used mainly as a marketing and strategic tool, a means of capital and wealth accumulation, and is subservient to economic growth – efficiency gains will continue to be reinvested in further expanding production and consumption and to be transformed in wealth for the global plutocracy, ultimately exacerbating the global sustainability crisis.

What is the alternative?

Alternative ideas, models and practices to the contemporary form of green capitalism are already emerging.

Some approaches suggest a focus on the planetary boundaries within which humanity operates, prosperity without growth, or de-growth.

A myriad of examples are available on how these alternative models of the economy can work and where they are working – especially when coupled with community involvement, union and social activism, decentralization, cooperative forms of organization, and radical and democratic ecological experimentation.

Yet, these are still fringe movements and pale in comparison to the damage inflicted by capitalism to nature, even under its green mantle.

Showing the way towards just sustainabilities

Ideationally, current discussions of just sustainabilities have important insights to offer. In Just Sustainabilities: Development in an Unequal World, Professor of Urban and Environmental Politics and Planning at Tufts University Julian Ageyman and colleagues argue for the need to ensure a better quality of life for all, now and in the future, in an equitable manner, and by living within the limits of supporting ecosystems.

They suggest that a path towards just sustainabilities entails addressing inequality – since it drives competitive consumption and leads to a lower level of trust in societies, which makes public action more difficult.

They also call for focusing on improving quality of life and wellbeing, rather than growth; for a community economy and increased public consumption; for reimagining the needs of current and future generations; and for a paradigm of sufficiency, rather than the maximization of consumption.

Ethical consumption is not enough

Paying attention to what we buy and how it was produced remains important, but we cannot buy our way into a sustainable future.

The imperatives of growth and consumption are part of the problem and cannot be the solution. Although the ideas for reform and incremental change, including those discussed in Business, Power and Sustainability, are important, we also need more radical social and economic transformation and we need to create new spaces for alternatives.

This is why understanding the power dynamics underpinning green capitalism is so important – as they indicate the pressure points that public actors and civil society can use to leverage not only reform but also more radical change.

This knowledge can expose the Achilles’ heel of green capitalism and stack the quivers of government and civil society with the arrows necessary for just sustainabilities to be achieved.

Taking the Environment Seriously in Agricultural Global Value Chains: Why It Matters to the Bottom

13/06/2019

By Aarti Krishnan, University of Manchester & the Overseas Development Institute

With the advancement of globalisation, 80% of trade flows through global value chains (GVCs). Agriculture and agro-processing GVCs are one of the largest employers for less developed countries, especially in Africa and Asia. With demand for food growing globally between 59% to 98% by 2050, and a world population estimated at 9.7 billion, there will be a severe drain on finite natural resources of land, water, materials and energy, that our economy depends on. Researchers have called for an urgent need to decouple environmental degradation from economic growth so that the economy can grow without using more resources and exacerbating environmental problems.

Some allude to the decoupling delusion, suggesting that genuine decoupling is impossible. Rather, they advocate substituting ‘intensively negative environmental practices’ with less intensive or neutral practices. This should be accompanied by shifting the environmental pressures of greening ‘ through compliance to standards’ down the value chain to lower tier suppliers like farmers and micro enterprises (MEs) in less developed and developing countries.

If indeed there is such a high dependence on ‘greening from the bottom’, then how long can farmers and MEs be squeezed to bear the burden of environmental costs for everyone else in the value chain? To understand this, we need to unpack the reciprocal relationships between the environment, farmers and MEs.

WHY do we need to take the environment seriously in global value chains?

There are only a few ‘places’ in the world where we can grow specific types of foods, for instance, there are only 9 countries where avocados can be grown, thus large retailers such as supermarkets (e.g. Walmart, Tesco, Carrefour), online grocers (e.g. Ocado, Big Basket) and processors (e.g. Del Monte, Cargill, ADM) carefully select ‘places’ based on the natural endowments and resource deposits that they can appropriate to sustain their profits. Consequently, many of these ‘places’ are in Africa and Asia. Farmers, by virtue of their livelihood, are ‘fixed’ to specific ‘places’. These ‘places’ are fixed because of two elements . The first is farmers’ land (size, soil quality) and water access on farmland and other geological and topographical factors; and the second is the vulnerability to uncertain climate change and shocks farmers face, which compounds possible degradation of a farmer’s ‘place’.

It is in this same ‘place’ where large Northern retailers push farmers to adhere to a variety of stringent and technical and environmental standards, such as Fairtrade, Organic, Rainforest Alliance, which thrust new and non-indigenous farming practices onto farmers. This leads to the formation of new networks, i.e. farmers now work with Northern firms, and a different set of intermediaries that cater to these firms. In most cases, the national government will sync their interest to the expectations of Northern firms, in the hope of increasing their international exports. This is turn changes the dynamics of how food is produced, distributed and sold. A plethora of research shows that farmers find adhering to standards a complex process, forcing them out of the value chain. Studies have shown very mixed impacts of standards. In some cases, standard compliance has increased farmers’ revenues and provided fairer wages while simultaneously leading to environmental degradation, which in turn prevents farmers from sustaining their livelihood in the long-term. This means that farmers are not only ‘embedded’ into certain places with natural endowments and uncertainties of climate change, but also embedded into networks which are dominated by large international supermarkets and new intermediaries. Therefore, farmers’ livelihoods and places are not separable. Farmers value their environment differently from how large firms do. My research found that farmers claimed that they valued to conserve their environment not only for commercial reasons but also to maintain stewardship, because of attachment to their land and to be able to bequest land to their children.

Are we looking at the environment the wrong way around?

The problem has been that we have been looking at the ‘environment’ from the point of view of how we (humans) need to find ‘fixes’ for an environment that we (humans) have ‘broken’. Because environmental values differ for different actors, we cannot create a ‘one size fits all’ solution.

There have been attempts to create ‘one size fits all’ kind of solutions to environmental degradation by embedding ‘green’ into products. This has been driven top-down by Northern firms and countries, through four main routes: (a) through products, by pushing for the use of greener inputs (e.g. organic fertilizers) and by increasing tariffs to tax ‘virtual pollution’ (e.g. on imports of goods that have high carbon footprint); (b) through processes, using green technologies to increase the efficiency of transactions; (c) by monitoring and evaluating environmental standards and certifications; and (d) by stimulating change in consumer behaviour (e.g. eating less meat). What all these solutions have in common is that they come from top-down perspective of how certain powerful actors ‘value the environment’, rather than considering how, for example, farmers in Africa ‘value the same environment’.

When factoring in the views from the ‘bottom’, critical paradoxes arise. Embedding green into products, raising tariffs due to virtual pollution and changing consumer behaviour will cause a significant fall in GDP and employment rates across Africa and Asia. Since many African and Asian countries depend on exports of natural resources and agricultural and mining commodities. Also, pushing the need to use highly complex green technologies raises issues of affordability, access and adaptability to low-resource farmers who lack technical know-how. This could eventually lead to their exclusion from global value chains.

Thus, delivering a carbon neutral regime, needs to begin with the bottom billion, where the impact is most felt. This requires both bottom-up and top-down strategies to synergize, through gaining a value chain-level understanding of how different actors ‘value the environment’.