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“Creative Hustling”: new book by Robin Steedman

By Robin Steedman

The film industry is a notoriously difficult place for women to make a living. Women still struggle to break through the ‘celluloid ceiling’ and make films on their own terms. In Nairobi, Kenya, however, they are flourishing. Why is this the case?

In my new book, Creative Hustling: Women Making and Distributing Films from Nairobi, I answer that question. 

I argue that women succeed in building careers in the film industry and making excellent cinema because they hustle.

Nairobi is not an easy place to be a filmmaker: for example, there is no meaningful state support for filmmaking and there is a very small domestic market where films can be screened and sold. Female filmmakers entrepreneurially navigate this precarious context, which is to say they hustle. 

A case in point of hustling is film producer Appie Matere producing fifty-six hour-long films for the South African TV company M-Net in a five-month period from a single location. As I say in the book, she described the process as follows:

It was so crazy because all the interiors had to be in this house for the films so that we can be able to work within the budget and within the timeframe […] we had to build sets here for all of them. So this room now … could be a restaurant, in another half an hour you come back and it’s a classroom. And the [handy men] are on standby waiting to paint or whatever it was. … It was crazy.

She succeeded in producing movies in a totally unconventional way. Not all projects made by female filmmakers in Nairobi are successful of course, but what is remarkable in their work is how open they were to experimentation, to making films across genres and formats to keep telling stories. 

They continually confronted problems, facing them in innovative ways. Such as when Jackie Lebo described her strategy of dealing with the pervasive film piracy in Nairobi as “leaning in” to piracy rather than trying to change it. She took a long-term view and tried to build a local audience through piracy in the hope this audience would one day turn into a paying market, and in the meantime, she could demonstrate having an audience when she applied for funding for her next production.

Making creative features films—such as famous films like Rafiki (directed by Wanuri Kahiu) and Saikati (directed by Anne Mungai)—is one aspect of the work these filmmakers do, and certainly the most high profile. But it isn’t the only aspect. I argue that understanding how filmmakers in Nairobi come to make these movies requires understanding the full scope of their work—from documentaries, to television, to commissioned and corporate work. Only when we consider this ecosystem in its entirety can we understand how it is that women have come to create such a vibrant industry in Nairobi. 

It is through their hustling work that women have created something remarkable. 

Creative Hustling is available open access from MIT Press: https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262544832/creative-hustling/

Robin Steedman is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS). Her research focuses on work, entrepreneurship, and hustling in filmmaking and other creative industries in Africa. Her current postdoctoral work is part of the major research project ‘Advancing Creative Industries for Development in Ghana’ (ACIG).

“The Humanitarian Exit Dilemma: The Moral Cost of Withdrawing Aid”: new book by Chin Ruamps

by Chin Ruamps

Humanitarian crises are widespread and affect millions of people around the world. In response, relief aid and humanitarian resources are distributed to affected populations by international non-governmental organisations, such as humanitarian organisations. These organisations provide essential goods such as food, shelter, and medical supplies. According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Reports, billions of dollars were contributed worldwide in response to humanitarian emergencies in recent years. For example, in 2012, US$17.3 billion was contributed worldwide, reaching 76 million people in need. In 2013, US$20.5 billion was distributed to 78 million people. In 2014, the expenditure on international humanitarian aid rose to a record high of US$24.5 billion to assist an additional 122 million people in need.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented challenges to humanitarian aid efforts. The pandemic has intensified existing needs and led to new crises, resulting in an estimated 243.8 million people requiring humanitarian assistance in 2020. By 2022, the COVID-19 pandemic had continued to aggravate humanitarian needs alongside other pre-existing crises, affecting an estimated 306 million people across the globe. The impacts of COVID-19 have distracted resources from other essential needs, leaving more affected populations without vital support. This has further stretched the capacity of humanitarian organisations, which are facing morally difficult decisions in determining which needs to satisfy and on what grounds. 

On the one hand, humanitarian organisations are tasked with addressing the needs of those suffering from man-made disasters such as conflicts and wars. During conflicts, affected populations are often forced to suffer inhumane and violent treatment, such as involuntary military recruitment, sexual abuse, and physical attacks. Conflicts concentrated in the Gaza Strip in 2012, South Sudan in 2013, and Syria in 2014 highlight the troubling nature of humanitarian crises and the urgent need for international humanitarian assistance. 

On the other hand, natural disasters and epidemics have driven needs to unprecedented levels. Climate-change-induced crises such as the tropical cyclone that hit Myanmar in 2008 and the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 demonstrate the extreme scale of natural disasters. Natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and man-made conflicts are often interrelated and correlated. Protracted natural disasters and long-winded epidemics often trigger political turmoil and economic collapse, which in turn leads to violent conflicts resulting in system failures. The ongoing emergent conflict in Afghanistan in 2021 and Ukraine in 2022 has been intensified and exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Large-scale humanitarian needs and assistance call for urgent response and immediate humanitarian intervention. However, humanitarian assistance and relief aid may cause more harm than good to affected populations, especially in complex emergencies, and it can be misused, as occurred in Nigeria’s civil war in the late 1960s; in Cambodia’s political violence in the 1980s; and in Rwanda in the 1990s. Humanitarian assistance can also bestow legitimacy on authoritarian regimes by cooperating with them, as seen in Myanmar. Humanitarian organisations have been forced to accept the enforced policy to gain access and assist the Rohingya people, resulting in criticism of them for being complicit in the Myanmar government’s unfair segregation policies.

How should humanitarian organisations respond when their aid goes awry? Should they stay and remain engaged with the needy, or should they withdraw and leave? Humanitarian practitioners often are too concerned with the outcome of action but fail to recognise that there are other equally weighty moral considerations they should consider. Focusing simply on the results of projects, such as the number of lives saved alone, is inadequate. The unique ‘Humanitarian Exit Dilemma’ that confronts humanitarian organisations should be understood as a moral quandary of conflicting values, and this ethical dilemma requires a value-based normative account to provide an adequate answer. 

These questions are discussed further in my recently published book, ‘The Humanitarian Exit Dilemma: The Moral Cost of Withdrawing Aid’. The book is aimed at teaching at BA and master levels, as well as a broader audience with an interest in the dynamics of economic inequality.

Chin Ruamps is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Management, Society and Communication. I am also an affiliated research member of the HUMAC research group. Her current research focuses on the legitimacy concern and ethical issue of private sector engagement in humanitarian action. She hopes to examine the fundamental conflict of business-humanitarian partnerships and ultimately provide an ethical and sustainable way forward through analytical and qualitative research methods.

Piketty analyzed: strengths and weaknesses of the emerging paradigm of inequality economics

by Rune Møller Stahl

In the past decade, economic inequality has moved from a position of relative marginality to the center of attention for academics, policy professionals, and even major institutions such as the OECD, IMF, and the World Economic Forum at Davos that were an earlier bastion of economic orthodoxy. This transformation has shifted the focus from poverty to economic inequality in many forums, and from looking at social problems at the bottom of income distribution to also looking at the problematic effects of wealth concentration at the top.

The French economist Thomas Piketty is a central figure at the heart of this transformation. His work is a lens through which to look at the strengths and weaknesses of the emerging paradigm of inequality economics. 

Piketty’s research on inequality is based on an analysis of historical data on income and wealth distribution in advanced economies, including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. His central argument put forward primarily in his 2013 book Capital in the 21st Century, is that in capitalist economies the rate of return on capital is typically higher than the rate of economic growth. This means that over time those who own capital (such as property or stocks) will accumulate more wealth than those who rely on wages or salaries for their income. This dynamic has played out over the last few decades, resulting in a significant increase in income and wealth inequality. For example, in the United States, the top 10% of earners saw their share of national income rise from around 30% in the 1970s to over 50% in recent years. Piketty argues that this trend is unsustainable and poses a threat to social and economic stability in the long term.

Piketty’s work has significant implications for economic policy and the way we think about economic development. It challenges the traditional view that economic growth is the key driver of prosperity and social progress. Piketty argues that economic growth alone is not sufficient to reduce inequality and that policymakers need to focus on measures that promote a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. Piketty’s research also highlights the importance of progressive taxation and redistribution in reducing inequality. He argues that without these measures, the concentration of wealth will continue to increase, leading to social unrest and political instability.

In more recent work, notably Capital and Ideology from 2019, Piketty and his research team broaden the historical and geographic scope of our understanding of inequality by focusing on the profound impact of colonialism on the development of inequality. European colonies of the 18th and 19th centuries were among the most unequal societies in the historical record. The slave colonies such as French St Domingue (current day Haiti) and the southern states of the US stand out with extreme levels of inequality in income and wealth.  The figure below provides an estimate of the comparative levels of income distribution in France compared to the colonial possessions of Algeria and Haiti in different historical periods. 

While Thomas Piketty’s work provides great empirical advances and has greatly widened the spatial and temporal scope of the discussion of economic inequality, his work also points towards some of the limits of the emerging field of inequality economics. When it comes to addressing inequality, his main proposals relate to the use of progressive taxation of wealth and income to redistribute resources from the top to the bottom of the income distribution. However, this points to the issue of power, especially state power. The role and the character of the state are not theorized systematically in Piketty’s work, and the ability of the state to redistribute a large part of national income, especially in the face of opposition from powerful economic forces, does not emerge as a problem. 

The issues of state power are exacerbated when it comes to the international level. Problems of international coordination around issues of taxation and spending are massive. There are massive barriers to a proposal of a global wealth tax, which forms a central part of Piketty’s proposal for addressing inequality. This is a dilemma that has been explored extensively in the field of international relations, and further cross-disciplinary dialogue with neighboring disciplines would greatly strengthen the emerging field of inequality economics. 

These questions and others are discussed further in my recent Danish language book Introduction til Piketty – ulighed, retfærdighed og demokrati. The book is aimed at teaching at BA and master level, as well as a general audience with an interest in the dynamics of economic inequality. 

Rune Møller Stahl is an Assistant Professor in Political Economy at Copenhagen Business School. His research is situated in the field of international political economy with a special focus on the history of economic ideas.

How and why firms in low-income countries seek to build capabilities in new export industries?

by Ayelech T. Melese and Lindsay Whitfield

Industrialization is the main driver of higher per capita incomes and a rising standard of living in low-income countries. Industrialization may be catalyzed by foreign direct investment. However, it is sustained by national firms becoming internationally competitive in range of industries, which should increase in technological complexity as firms building their technological and organizational capabilities. 

In contemporary global production and trade systems, locally owned firms in low-income countries find themselves in an increasingly difficult situation. They have limited existing knowledge of the industry and thus face a large gap in the capabilities they have and those that are required to be internationally competitive. Over the past decades, the barriers to entry in even basic manufacturing and agriculture-based export industries have increased. These barriers to entry include stringent and fast changing requirements by Western buyers, strict proprietary rights, and stiff global competition from suppliers in other low and middle-income countries. Locally owned firms must build their capabilities but face big risks in doing so as they often have scarce financial resources, weak international networks, and operate in precarious business and political environments. 

In such a context, one would wonder what can motivate local firms to enter an export industry new to their country, invest in learning, and succeed in build their technological capabilities. Seeking to answer these questions, we examined the locally owned firms in Ethiopian floriculture export industry which emerged in the 1990s, following the coming of a new government into power and the subsequent policy shift from command to mixed economy. Local firms must master significant technological and organizational skills to run a cut-flower firm, which is more like manufacturing than agriculture.

Drawing extensively on the historical evidence, scholars of industrialization in East Asia emphasized that industrial policy has been the key driver of private investment and firm level learning. This literature significantly contributed in highlighting what the industrial policies should look like and how they should be customized to the twenty-first century’s context to achieve similar effect in low income countries in Africa and elsewhere. Notwithstanding the important contributions, the industrial policy literature has given limited attention to firm-level dynamics of learning and agency of firms in (re)allocating resources based on their own business strategies. 

Our examination of the Ethiopia’s floriculture export sector largely confirms the arguments of industrial policy scholars. The sector went through exponential growth during the period 2002 to 2008. This growth was driven by sector specific industrial policies that provided generous incentive packages and infrastructural support that spurred both local and foreign investment, but notably significantly lowered the entry barriers and risks for local investors as they sought to build the required capabilities. 

However, the sector did not keep the momentum of growth and technological upgrading for long. In the 2010s, as growth in the sector stagnated, the number of local firms declined significantly. Only fifteen local firms managed to survive and thrive, most which were part of family-owned diversified business groups. Our analysis shows that the local owners of cut-flower farms often sought to develop only the minimum capabilities needed to sustain their cut-flower exports. Government industrial policies which incentivized local entrepreneurs to invest in the sector did not entail performance standards that tied the financing and other support to export performance and thus firms had little incentive to continue to invest in learning. 

Scholars of global value chains (GVC) discussed the important role and potentials of GVC configurations to bolster learning and upgrading opportunities of local firms in low-income firms. Upgrading is often confined to a certain level as local supplier firms encounter various control mechanisms exercised by lead firms in the GVC. However, local firms can exercise their agency with a much broader scope that is often (implicitly) assumed. The case of Ethiopia’s cut-flower export industry shows that local firms can pursue growth paths within and across GVCs, as they are part of diversified business groups and firm owners make decisions not only about the growth of the cut-flower firm but also about the overall profitability of their business group. 

The mapping of the floriculture GVC below shows that flowers are traded in the Dutch auction, which remains the dominant channel, and through direct sales to wholesalers, supermarkets, and other retailers, which has become more important since the 1990s.  The specification of buyers in the direct sales channel depends on their end-markets and market segments. Consumers with special demands often buy flowers from specialized outlets such as florists and web-shops. 

Source: Adapted by the authors from ‘Product factsheet: fresh cut-flowers and foliage in the European specialized retail market,’ Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries,  https://www.cbi.eu/sites/default/fles/market_information/researches/productfactsheet-europe-freshcut-fowers-foliage-retail-market-2016.pdf

By the time Ethiopia joined the global cut-flower industry, the abundant year-long supply was causing stiff competition and putting downward pressure on suppliers’ profit margins. Non-price competition such as reliability and consistency in terms of product quality, quantity and delivery was becoming more important. As a result, buyers’ requirements became more stringent to differentiate products, but also address growing consumer and non-governmental organizations’ concerns about labour and environmental issues on flower farms.

Ethiopia’s national firms chose various export trajectories combining different market channels and end-markets, while protecting or improving the overall profitability of their family-owned diversified business groups. These export trajectories dictated which capabilities they needed to build and to which level to keep their flower export firm internationally competitive and thus retain buyers.

In this context, owners’ decisions for their cut-flower firms and their growth paths were influenced by the limited resources of their diversified business groups and showed significant variations. Firm owners sometimes chose to invest less in building the capabilities of their flower export firms to release resources and managerial talents to other affiliate businesses or make investments in new domestic market industries. On the other hand, some family business groups transferred resources from their domestic market-focused firms to subsidize the costs of building capabilities in their flower export firms. 

The analysis also shows how the higher organizational and managerial demands of operating a firm in a competitive export industry like floriculture precipitated a move toward modern management practices in this first generation of family business groups in Ethiopia. These findings emphasize the need to consider local firms’ capabilities and position with family business groups when designing industrial policy.

Read more in our recently published article:  

Industrial policy, local firm growth paths, and capability building in low-income countries: lessons from Ethiopia’s floriculture export sector, Industrial and Corporate Change, advanced access.

Crisis mode in the Sri Lankan apparel industry: a closer look at the implications for firms and workers 

By Shyamain Wickramasingha

How can an entire industry flourish during a crisis, yet plunge its workers into precarity? 

As Sri Lanka is battling its worst economic crisis for 70 years, this blog looks at the crisis’s paradoxical effects on the firms and workers in the Sri Lankan apparel industry. 

Sri Lanka: economic crisis and the apparel industry

Sri Lanka is currently battling with what is being described as the worst economic crisis since the country’s independence in 1948. In March 2022, Sri Lanka declared itself bankrupt, having defaulted its foreign debts of over $55bn. Without adequate foreign reserves, the government has been struggling for over a year now to provide its citizens with the most basic needs such as fuel, electricity, gas, essential drugs, and foods. The food security is severely threatened by the ongoing fertilizer problem in the country which has destroyed and slowed the growth of crops including rice, vegetables, and fruits. 

Against this turbulent economic backdrop, the fate of the apparel industry has been a major concern. The apparel industry is the most significant contributor to the economy, accounting for over 45% of the country’s export earnings. Media, researchers, and industry stakeholders predicted and continue to express their concern that the country’s economic turmoil and political instability could adversely affect apparel exports. On the one hand, stakeholders were concerned that the lack of steady supply of fuel and electricity would affect the smooth operations of the industry. On the other, it was noted that brands and retailers have started to move sourcing orders from Sri Lanka to neighboring countries to mitigate the risks. As JustStyle reported in mid-2022, some of the expected consequences were loss of business and revenue and re-location of production to other countries. Furthermore, given that Sri Lanka’s apparel production relies on imported raw material, an increased concern was the ability of Sri Lankan manufacturers to afford the foreign currency reserves required to purchase raw material to fulfil orders. 

Winners and losers: the remarkable performance of the apparel industry 

As the crisis evolved through 2022 to 2023, contrary to these initial concerns, the apparel industry has been performing surprisingly well. A closer look at the crisis response reveals that the industry is cushioned by concessions granted by the government and advantages of foreign trade that are not available to local businesses. Power cuts, at times extended to 10-13 hours per day, did not apply to export processing zones and the garment factories located in other areas. Recognising the importance of export production, the government excluded the locations of garment factories in their electricity demand management schedule. Similarly, even though there has been a severe shortage of fuel – with fuel stations shut down for weeks – the apparel industry saw a steady supply of fuel. As quoted by a key apparel manufacturer “I think as an industry we have been fairly insulated throughout the crisis because there was a recognition that the only way out of the crisis is to focus on apparel and tourism. So, there were certain changes made by the government that allowed us to source raw material and operate factories without any interruptions”. In addition, with the US Dollar value going up 100% against the Sri Lankan rupee overnight in March 2022, the industry gained significantly from the exchange rate depreciation, especially since the workers’ salaries and some production costs remained unchanged. Furthermore, manufacturers have been able to keep some of the revenue in offshore accounts, a practice currently being debated and criticised by media and activists. 

Despite the ongoing political and economic turbulence in the market, investors have continued to show interest in the sector. The Board of Investment Sri Lanka reported that it has signed agreements worth $76m for new investments and expansions in the sector in 2022. The industry’s remarkable resilience against the economic challenges were shown with an all-time high revenue of exports in 2022. As per the Joint Apparel Association Forum, June 2022 recorded the highest performance for a month ever reported in the industry, with a 39.45% growth of export revenue. By December 2022, Sri Lanka reported $5.6bn revenue from apparel exports, a 10% increase from 2021 and a 5.6% increase from 2019, the pre-pandemic context. Thus, contrary to the mainstream opinion that the economic crisis would set-back the apparel industry, the industry has shown not only resilience but a significant growth. 

Growth of exports revenue in the Sri Lankan apparel industry: 2004 – 2022

Based on the data published by Sri Lanka Apparel, January 2023 (https://www.srilankaapparel.com/data-center/yearly-performance/)

Winners and losers: where are the workers?

The resilience of the capitalist economic system is such that even against unprecedented disruptions, capitalists emerge as stronger than ever. The moment a crisis strikes, the foremost concern of nation states and capitalists is the resilience and recovery of business. To this end, governments prioritise the needs and wants of businesses, with greater concessions granted to business owners to deal with the crisis. Existing strategies are strengthened, new strategies are drawn, and new plans are made. Yet, this latest example of the Sri Lankan economic crisis shows that workers who are toiling at the bottom end of the businesses are left behind. 

While the apparel industry has grown from strength to strength, apparel workers are being pushed to further precarity. As a manufacturer himself admitted, “the real people who felt the crunch of the economic crisis are workers”. Since March 2022, living costs have increased at an unprecedented rate, with prices of essential goods going up by 400%. In contrast, existing standards of the industry are eroded, with workers having to deal with loss of financial and material benefits such as overtime, bonuses, increments, transport, and free or subsidized meals. This has left over 350,000 apparel workers who were already living on subsistence income struggling to survive with their monthly salary. Their salary falls between $45 – $90, with $45 being the minimum wages in the industry and $90 being the total take home salary including overtime and production incentives that are available for workers. With salaries remaining the same and some of the incentives removed, apparel workers are struggling to fulfil even their basic needs. Even though a monthly Emergency Relief Allowance (ERA) around $27 for workers has been established to counter the effects of currency devaluation and skyrocketing inflation on workers’ livelihoods, the Clean Clothes Campaign found that apparel workers have not been receiving the full ERA. With the absence of any support mechanisms, local civil society organisations in the Katunayake Export Processing Zone revealed that they are currently running soup kitchens every weekend to provide meals for the most vulnerable segments of workers such as pregnant and lactating mothers. How does one reconcile this paradox: while the industry is thriving, its workers are starving?

Images of soup kitchen operated by Dabindu Collective, Katunayake Free Trade Zone

Image source: Dabindu Collective.  

Making sense of the paradox that does not make sense… 

Externalising the costs of business has been the modus operandi of capitalists, where these costs are often born by the society and environment at large. In this vein, has the resilience and recovery of the Sri Lankan apparel industry been achieved partly at the cost of the financial, material, and emotional wellbeing of workers? Do the apparel workers lives matter less? These workers, integral to the Sri Lankan economy, are largely part of the hidden workforce of global supply chains and already face poverty wages and very few if no social protections. The economic and social disruption of crises – both the Covid19 pandemic and the economic crisis –  have threatened the long-term livelihoods and wellbeing of hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankan apparel workers, predominantly women and primary caregivers in their families. 

In an industry where ethical sourcing is supposedly playing a central role, how ethical is it to leave the workers behind in the capitalist agendas of resilience and recovery? As the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) revealed in early 2023, many attempts to engage with brands urging them to take actions to safeguard the livelihoods of their workers have been futile so far, except for ASOS, Patagonia, and Victoria’s Secret who have reacted positively. Throughout the year of the crisis, CCC has been calling upon brands to ensure that the workers in their Sri Lankan supply chains are paid the ERA unconditionally while securing workers right to organise. As a trade union quoted, “Sri Lankan garment workers have contributed to making these brands rich. Therefore, the least these brands can do is to ensure their workers get through the crisis”.  The story of Sri Lankan apparel workers in crisis has laid bare the systemic failure of brands’ ethical codes. Ethical codes have barely been able to protect apparel workers at the best of times, but they have been little to no use when the crisis struck. Brands can no longer continue to pretend that their regulatory interventions are working on the grounds. This leaves us with an important question. How can decent work really be ensured in global supply chains? Who should and can take the responsibility to protect workers’ interests? Where do we go from this point? 

Operation in crisis mode now seems to be the ‘new normal’ for global supply chains.  For Sri Lanka, economists predict that it will take at least ten years to reverse the effects of the crisis. Precisely because of this, the Sri Lankan apparel industry is in urgent need of an inclusive, just, and equitable plan that will ensure not just the resilience and the growth of the industry, but also the material and emotional wellbeing of its workers. If a commitment to such a plan is not forthcoming from brands and manufacturers, then it is the responsibility of the government to safeguard the rights of workers. 

If the government is also not capable of stepping up to do what it should have been doing in the first place, then the only realistic solution is a collective intervention delivered through a multi-stakeholder initiative. Such an approach can be similar to the Bangladeshi Accord (the Accord on Fire and Building Safety), with legal teeth to hold brands and manufacturers responsible for living wages and fair working conditions in the industry. A focused and targeted intervention like this can only be driven at the global scale by workers representatives, where enforcement is grounded on a chain of market sanctions, seeking first to influence consumer decisions and apply pressure on brands, with the brands transferring this pressure to manufacturers through their purchasing decisions. Like in the case of the Accord, such a collective effort may have the potential to protect workers interests and ensure that workers are not left behind. It will help workers cope as the economic crisis and the resultant inflation escalate at an unprecedented rate in the country, creating havoc on their lives and livelihoods for years to come. 

Shyamain Wickramasingha is a Research Fellow at the University of Sussex Business School, and a Visiting Fellow at CBDS, within the Department of Management, Society and Communication at Copenhagen Business School. Her work focuses on the political economy of global production networks with an emphasis on inter-firm relations, uneven development, and labour regimes. 

Additional resources on the Sri Lankan apparel export industry by the author: