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The Belt and Road Initiative at Ten

25 October 2023

By Federico Jensen

This year marks the tenth-year anniversary of Xi Jinping’s proposal for an “economic belt along the silk road” while on a diplomatic mission to Kazakhstan, what would later become the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or One Belt One Road (OBOR) in Chinese (一带一路). Chinese state-owned firms, under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative, have built pipelines, railroads, roads, ports, and other infrastructures, especially in regions that private investors deem too risky to invest. The Chinese government estimates that it has spent 1 trillion USD for the development of transportation and energy infrastructure and other infrastructure projects in over 3000 projects globally. This spree of infrastructure building has captivated policymakers focused on the rise of Chinese economic and political international influence. The BRI has also led to contentious global politics around investments and has intensified geopolitical competition between China and the US. This post discusses the last ten years of the BRI and the ways in which it is evolving.

Belt and Road Initiative as the cornerstone of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) pledged massive infrastructural investment to enhance the connectivity of China with the rest of Asia, Africa, and globally. It also became discursively entrenched with the foreign policy strategy of Xi Jinping. Although other Chinese policymakers had already promoted the idea of outward Chinese investments, such as the ‘go out policy’ initiated by Jiang Zemin in 2000, the BRI was the first time that a Chinese outward investment strategy had been articulated directly as foreign policy (as stated in state council guidelines in 2015). The BRI was then imprinted into the Chinese communist party constitution in 2017 as a central element of foreign policy. In so doing, all layers of the Chinese government apparatus, and its economic arms: banks, and state-owned firms became involved in the development of infrastructure investments abroad.

The Belt and Road, simplified map
Source: https://denstoredanske.lex.dk/%22Belt_and_Road%22-initiativet;
license: CC BY SA 4.0.

Empty ports? Successes and failures of the BRI in its first ten years

Although much attention has been placed on massive ‘white elephant’ projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and all its subprojects, the reality is that the projects included within the BRI framework vary dramatically in size and scope. At the same time, the success or failure of projects has been hard to determine. 

Apart from promised projects that have not yet materialized, as it is the case for example of Bagamoyo port, cancelled by Tanzanian authorities after a change in government (and now perhaps getting restarted after a new change of government in Tanzania), projects that have been constructed have had less than advertised results. For example, the much-discussed Gwadar port in Pakistan is one of the most used examples of infrastructure developments under the BRI not delivering expected economic results. Gwadar port not only has underperformed economically, as it has not provided a suitable alternative to the congested Karachi port, but it has also exacerbated the difficult political situation in the Balochistan region of Pakistan. The port is the center of many protests and is used as an image of the weakness of the Pakistani government and its subdued relationship with China. At the same time, many China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects in the region surrounding the port continue to materialize, such as industrial parks and special economic zones, a highway linking Gwadar all the way to the Chinese border with Pakistan. As these other projects continue in the region, they could change the commercial landscape for the port. 

Finally, as many other scholars have discussed in relation to Chinese investments abroad, local agency is important. Not only had Gwadar port been on the planning table of Pakistani authorities for over 20 years, but the Pakistani government insisted on its inclusion as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor even as Chinese commercial actors showed no interest in the project. This showcases both the way in which local authorities and local politics shape projects but also the way in which different Chinese firms and authorities have maneuvering room to decide which projects to be a part of within the fragmented Chinese institutional politics.

Gwadar Port – Source: Flickr – License: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).

The next ten years – new directions for the BRI

The 3rd Belt and Road Forum celebrated this October 17th and 18th in Beijing, marks the official celebration of the tenth anniversary. It did so by pledging 100 billion USD in new investments and by highlighting a shift in focus for the BRI. From pure infrastructure development to a focus on digital services, green development, and renewable energy projects as well as more ‘soft’ collaborations. For instance, one of the twenty new collaborations signed between China and Pakistan included a one-year agreement for knowledge transfer port development and management for the Gwadar port, indicating perhaps the focus of the BRI moving away from pure infrastructure building and into making existing investments commercially viable. 

Nonetheless, one key outcome of the 3rd Belt and Road Forum has been to highlight its continued relevance, particularly for the global south, with many heads of state present and making new investment deals with China. Even in the times of continued and growing geopolitical contestation between East and West and continued calls for decoupling or de-risking from China. The BRI forum reminds us to not underestimate the relevance of China for the global economy and global trade.

COSCO shipping ship docked at Port of Rotterdam – Source: the author.

Listen to the Business in Development Podcast and find out more!

The Belt and Road Initiative at ten, geopolitics and China’s role in global development

Professor Lindsay Whitfield from CBDS discusses the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative, the contentious politics it engenders, and the role of massive Chinese infrastructural investments globally with Dr. Federico Jensen, external lecturer at Copenhagen Business School. In the episode, they discuss the origins of the Belt and Road Initiative, it’s economic and political successes and failures, and the role of local governments in investment receiving countries.

Listen in your favourite podcast app

Further reading: 

Jones, L, & Hameiri, S. (2021) Fractured China, How State Transformation is Shaping China’s Rise. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge

Lee, C. K. (2017). The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Ye, M. (2020). The belt road and beyond: State-mobilized globalization in China: 1998–2018. Cambridge University Press. NY, USA

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Federico Jensen has recently finished his PhD at Copenhagen Business School. His academic work centers around the international political economy of maritime shipping and offshore industries. 


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Wayúu Women Leading the Charge: Rethinking Green Energy Investments through a Decolonial Feminist Lens 

3 October 2023

By Jacobo Ramirez

Climate change is a pressing global issue that requires immediate action. As countries and multinational companies invest in green energy, it’s easy to assume that we’re making ethical choices. However, this is not always the case, green initiatives perpetuate a new form of colonialism, effectively making them green colonialism. Our recent study – Green Colonialism and Decolonial Feminism: A Study of Wayúu Women’s Resistance in La Guajira, uncovers how the rush to renewable energy is affecting Indigenous communities, specifically the Wayúu women in La Guajira, Colombia.

The La Guajira Case

The implementation of Colombia’s Long-Term Climate Strategy E2050 has resulted in the transformation of indigenous territories in the La Guajira region into areas of conflict. The Colombian government and businesses frame this transition as a strategy aimed at offering economic support, with the simultaneous goals of tackling climate change and alleviating poverty. However, it is crucial to recognize that this process is not immune to instances of exploitation, domination, and dispossession experienced by Wayúu communities and their lands. These communities face significant challenges such as inadequate infrastructure, limited access to water and education, and a heightened risk of malnutrition, child malnutrition, and mortality.

Why a Decolonial Feminist Perspective is Important

The present study utilized a decolonial feminist framework to examine the intricate relationship among gender, colonial legacies, and business ethics in the realm of green energy investments. This methodology enables the detection of hidden power dynamics and enhances the representation of Indigenous women, a demographic that often faces marginalization in mainstream discussions pertaining to environmental sustainability. The current study proposes that Wayúu women engage in the practice of feminist decoloniality with the objective of dismantling the concepts of modernity and the rationality linked to the energy transition. For Wayúu women, their place of origin holds a significance that extends beyond mere geographical boundaries. It encompasses a complex amalgamation of cultural, spiritual, and social elements, forming a rich and intricate fabric of their identity. According to a female Wayúu individual, “it is imperative to acknowledge and comprehend the Wayúu people’s perception of their territory in a manner that transcends oversimplification as mere symbolic representations”. This perspective warrants both respect and comprehensive understanding. Decolonial feminists assert the imperative of acknowledging and safeguarding their self-determination to protect their territories. 

What Policymakers and Businesses Need to Do

One of the primary findings of our research suggests that it is imperative for the Colombian government to enact the Colombian constitution, which acknowledges the presence and inherent rights of Indigenous communities. This implementation should include the provision of official titles for ancestral lands, encompassing an area that exceeds 25% of Colombia’s territory. To undertake large-scale projects, it is imperative for corporations and governments to establish genuine dialogues that demonstrate respect for the customs and traditional practices of Indigenous communities. It is imperative that these dialogues demonstrate a heightened awareness and consideration for Indigenous ontologies, as well as acknowledge the historical context of colonization that has disproportionately affected these communities. Corporations are obligated to adhere to normative instruments, such as the OECD guidelines, which aim to foster responsible business conduct among multinational enterprises. These guidelines encompass a range of areas including sustainable development, human rights, employment practices, taxation, information disclosure, and anti-corruption measures. 

The Grand Challenges Ahead

The research conducted in this study highlights the potential for subsequent studies to integrate decolonial feminism as a theoretical framework for examining Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, specifically in the Global South. Our study proposes that businesses should consider incorporating diverse perspectives beyond the prevailing Western worldview when formulating climate change mitigation actions and corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. By employing this methodology, researchers can gain novel insights into the social justice aspects linked to the transition towards sustainable energy sources. 

Concluding Thoughts

Climate change is framed as a global crisis by Western cultures, many of which have been the protagonists of historical colonization. Our research reveals the imperative of giving prominence to Indigenous knowledge and epistemologies within the framework of green transition policy decisions. The transition towards green energy encompasses not only technological and economic aspects, but also entails considerations of human rights, cultural preservation, and ethical governance. The intention of this research is to stimulate a more extensive discourse regarding the methods of transitioning towards a more environmentally sustainable future, while simultaneously upholding the rights and cultural practices of Indigenous communities. 

Further Readings

– Banerjee, 2021: Decolonizing Deliberative Democracy: Perspectives from Below

– Fjellheim 2023: You Can Kill Us with Dialogue:” Critical Perspectives on Wind Energy Development in a Nordic-Saami Green Colonial Context


Jacobo Ramirez is an Associate Professor in Latin American Business Development at the Department of Management, Society and Communication (MSC), Copenhagen Business School (CBS). He earned his doctoral degree in Business Administration at Newcastle University, England (2005), in collaboration with the Grenoble School of Management, France. His research focus is on sustainable business development in Latin America, a region with security risks, fragile formal institutions and social unrest, among other features, yet also a growing income. 

Value and Wealth Entanglements in the Gold Industry

18 September 2023

By Lotte Thomsen, Karen P.Y Lai and Stefano Ponte

Entanglements of value and wealth are essential features of contemporary global capitalism. Still, value and wealth have until now mainly been studied in isolation from each other. For our understanding of how value and wealth entangle, gold is a case in point. The Singaporean state has become a key player in the gold industry – establishing the country as a key gold hub – and not least in the shaping of value and wealth entanglements. Essentially, gold is allowed to flow unhindered to/from and within Singapore. It is placed behind a veil of secrecy that embraces free flows of gold among banks, corporations, refineries, consolidators and other key actors within the Singapore gold hub.

In our newly published paper State action and inaction in the shaping of value and wealth entanglements: The role of Singapore in the global ‘gold chain’, we reveal the entanglements of value and wealth in the gold sector. We unpack the roles played by the Singaporean state and distinguish between state actions and inactions in shaping the ways in which both tangible and intangible assets are configured and mobilised for value creation and capture, and for wealth accumulation and protection. While specific state actions are prominent in areas such as developing capital markets and allowing tax and license-free gold trading, we show how state inaction is also essential in value and wealth chains. Such inaction includes not monitoring the buying, selling and storage of gold. Thus, we pinpoint how the Singapore state is involved in the gold industry in ways that relate to its well-established functions as a financial centre and low-tax platform for Asian and global elites. Its functions embrace relations to gold mining beyond Singapore, gold refining, jewellery production, retail, pawning, and also to finance, trading and storage. Gold is both a financial instrument, and involve physical gold, bullion operations and vaulting infrastructure as key elements in the country’s wealth protection system. 

Based on our examination of the gold sector, we suggest a typology of state roles in value and wealth entanglements, arguing for the importance of including and distinguishing both active and inactive state roles. Such roles are highly interconnected and may change over time as a way of further supporting and shaping value and wealth entanglements. Examples include the carving out of ‘spaces of exception’ such as ‘luxury Freeports’ with discrete vaulting of gold bullion, ‘investment grade’ jewellery pieces and other collectibles for the super-rich. State inaction thus has bearings on attracting and retaining ‘the wealthy’ (to Singapore in our case) through a practice that we term ‘turning a blind eye’ on grey-zone activities. Thus, we pinpoint how state roles may not always address existing inequalities, but sometimes even develop new patterns of inequality, catering to protection of the rich rather than mass consumers or poorer households, shaping the processes and outcomes of value and wealth entanglements.

Read more in our newly published paper – it is open access:

Thomsen, L., Lai, K. P. Y., & Ponte, S. (2023). State action and inaction in the shaping of value and wealth entanglements: The role of Singapore in the global ‘gold chain.’ Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X231181128

International sanctions and increased vulnerabilities of supply chain workers: Polytex Garments Limited factory closure in Sri Lanka

30 June 2023

By Shyamain Wickramasingha

The alleged human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China led to US sanctions and then the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The US Congress passed this Act in December 2021, and it came into effect in June 2022. However, already in 2021 the US Customs and Border Protection issued a Withhold Release Order that blocked all imports from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which produces one-third of the cotton in China, and China is the second largest cotton grower after India. This blog discusses how the recent rise of economic sanctions against China, which are mainly targeted to specific locations, cause side effects along the wider supply chains. In particular, it shows how Sri Lanka’s apparel export industry was affected by the withdrawal of investment and closure of apparel factories by a Hong Kong firm hit with US sanctions.

Esquel Group and Polytex Garments Limited Sri Lanka

Polytex Garments Limited is a subsidiary of the Esquel Group, a textile and apparel manufacturer based in Hong Kong, China. Esquel is one of the largest woven shirt makers globally. Esquel acquired Polytex Garments Limited in 1983, soon after Sri Lanka opened its markets and was integrated into global apparel production networks. From a single factory building in 1983, Polytex grew into five large-scale factories by 2020. It employed around 7,000 apparel workers in total. 

A family-owned business, Esquel Group was founded in 1978 soon after the Chinese Economic Reforms (also known as the Chinese Economic Miracle and ‘Reform and Opening’ up). Because Esquel is heavily invested in the Xinjiang region, it cannot simply ‘de-risk’ from China, as other textile and apparel companies have started to do by sourcing cotton fabrics elsewhere. From cotton seeds research to product retailing, Esquel has become a total service and solution provider of textiles and apparel. Esquel operates cotton ginning and spinning factories in Xinjiang, including a highly automated spinning mill with only about 45 staff controlling the 30,000 spindles. It has textile mills in Gaoming in Southern China producing mostly woven fabric, and garment factory clusters across Southern China. Esquel’s business strategy of full integration focused on one product segment, its ‘China only’ approach, and its high capital investments in spinning mills in Xinjiang make it difficult for the company to divest from its factories in Xinjiang. Esquel used to have a joint venture with the Chinese state-owned Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps to attain high-quality raw cotton, but it was divested from cotton farming in April 2020. Notably, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps was a target of US sanctions announced in July 2020.

U.S. Sanctions and the Esquel Group 

In July 2020, the USA Department of Commerce placed the Esquel Group on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Entity List, which is a trade restriction list banning cotton and cotton products originating from the Xinjiang region in China. The ban aimed at pressuring the Chinese government over the alleged forced labour of the minority Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. This put onus on importing companies to ensure that none of their goods are even partially made in the region of Xinjiang. Companies on the Entity List are subject to U.S. license requirements for the export or transfer of specified items. In July 2021, Esquel filed a lawsuit seeking removal from the Entity List in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. government. In August 2021, Esquel was removed, with conditions, from the Entity List by the inter-agency End-User Review Committee. It is not clear what those conditions were, as they were not made public knowledge. Several weeks later, Esquel resumed its lawsuit after failing to reach an agreement with the U.S. Commerce Department regarding the timetable for removal and the specifics of the conditions for removal. 

In July 2022, Ecotextile news reported that Esquel Group had suffered another setback in its appeal to overturn US sanctions against its spinning mill in China’s Xinjiang region over alleged links to forced labour. The US Court of Appeals denied the appeal limiting Esquel’s access to US markets and goods. Consequently, as reported by the Clean Clothes Campaign in 2022, international clothing brands have been ending their business relationship with Esquel in Sri Lanka since 2020. This has forced Polytex Garments to do subcontracting work for local manufacturers. 

The claim of forced Uyghur labour is strongly denied by the Esquel Group. As quoted on their website “The decision to add Changi Esquel Textile Co. Ltd. to the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List is both misguided and unjust. We morally oppose the use of forced labour, which is completely contrary to our principles and the business practices by which we have operated for more than 40 years”. Esquel claims that it has provided extensive information about its operations, independent third-party audits, traceability documentation, supply chain maps, and a variety of other documents to the U.S. Department of Commerce and other relevant agencies “proving Esquel does not use forced or coerced labour”. Esquel claims that rather than addressing any of the facts they provided, the US government has chosen to continue to rely on a handful of misleading anecdotal media mentions and “poorly researched reports to justify its policy decisions”. On their website, Esquel claimed that they had to close several of their factories in various countries due to US sanctions. Esquel accuses the U.S. government’s “perfunctory fact-finding process has negatively affected thousands of innocent workers globally from Sri Lanka to Mauritius to Malaysia – whose livelihoods have been destroyed…” (Esquel Group; 20 June 2022).

Polytex Garments Limited in Sri Lanka – Messy closure and contested labour politics 

Esquel Group declared the Polytex factory closure in Sri Lanka as a direct result of US sanctions, a fact confirmed by trade unions and employers’ associations in Sri Lanka. As Esquel Group itself reported to JustStyle, it has cut production in Sri Lanka due to “the loss of many US customers”. 

The five factories of Polytex Garments Limited were located in Ekala, Kegalle, Koggala, and Yakkala, all out of Colombo. The first to close was the factory in Yakkala in 2020. According to a trade union, the reason for the closure of the first factory was cited as lack of orders and challenges faced due to the Covid19 pandemic. Most workers were given termination benefits, with the rest transferred to the Polytex factory in Ekala, closer to the Katunayake Free Trade Zone. Trade unions said that to facilitate this transfer, the Ekala factory had to fire all or most of the workers on probation, whose employment with the factory was less than six months. This fact however is not verified by the employers. Following this, the Ekala and Kagalle factories were closed in June 2022. As reported by JustStyle, the remaining two factories – Koggala 1 and Koggala 2 were closed in March 2023. For the latter two, permission from the Commissioner General of Labour to terminate the workers’ contract was still pending as of April 2023. As confirmed by unions and workers, Polytex Garments Limited had paid over and above the legally stipulated termination benefits including gratuity, employers provident fund, compensation payment according to the termination laws, and an additional three months’ salary. Polytex also waived off all outstanding loans taken by the workers. 

Polytex factory workers on strike outside the factory building

The events leading to the factory closures turned out to be messy and were highly contested by trade unions, workers, and employers. This was well reflected in the contrasting accounts shared by different stakeholders with regard to the closure of the Koggala factories. In spite of having spoken to multiple stakeholders – including workers, employers’ associations, trade unions, the labour department, and civil societies – it was difficult to have a clear understanding of exactly what happened during the closure of the last two factories in Koggala.  

According to the representatives of employers’ associations and the labour department, before the factory closure, Polytex sought to change the name of the company from Esquel to ‘JK Apparel Koggala Private Limited’ and continue operating in Sri Lanka. The reason for the name change as revealed by the employers association was to secure the orders and independently get the quotas required for direct manufacturing instead of subcontracting through other manufacturers. This name change was thus projected by the employers association as a strategic move by Polytex Sri Lanka to distance itself from the US sanctions on Esquel.  The main national trade union (Union) involved in the negotiation initially agreed to this. Workers were provided the assurance that the status and terms of employment would remain the same including salaries, job descriptions, promotion schemes, and accumulated gratuity and statutory benefits. Workers consented to this transfer in front of the Commissioner of Labour. The proceedings were discussed through a series of online meetings (due to the pandemic conditions) which were attended by all parties concerned including workers’ representatives, the labour department, employers’ representatives, and the management of Polytex. 

Employers’ associations alleged that the leader of the Union then “changed his word”. Instead, the Union had demanded that Polytex terminates the contract with workers, pay compensation and termination benefits plus an additional 20% to the workers. Upon paying these benefits, the Union had requested Polytex to re-hire the workers to the ‘new company’. As the employers’ association justified, Polytex Garments Limited could not afford to pay both the termination benefits and then continue the business with the new company, especially, as they were already financially hit by the pandemic and the US Sanctions. This resulted in the closure of the factories. 

The Union however shared a different version of the events that lead to the closure. According to the Union, the name change was already carried out by Polytex Koggala in 2022 and workers stayed on as employees for about one month after the name change. As a former worker of Polytex quoted “they explained to us that they could not get orders from America. They said they are changing the name to see if they could get orders”. But the Union said that they suspected that the two factories in Polytex Koggala were being sold to a financially non-viable businessman. The Union feared that a few months after the acquisition, the new buyer would go bankrupt, resulting in workers losing all accumulated benefits and compensation including gratuity and termination benefits. The Union cited this as their reason for the objections to the transfer of workers to the new factory. Subsequently, the unions advised workers not to agree to the transfer, resulting in the closure of the two factories in Koggala. 

Implications for apparel workers 

Indeed, Polytex workers were extremely disappointed and distressed about the factory closer. As a worker quoted “We tried very hard to stop the closure. We even met government ministers and the Board of Investment. We appealed to them to help the factory get orders”. Simultaneously many protests were being carried out by workers outside the Polytex factories reportedly against the closure of the factories. Some of these protests culminated in workers holding the General Manager and the Human Resources Manager of Polytex Garments Limited hostages on the factory premises. The two executives were rescued by army and police officers who arrived at the scene in the early hours of the following day. 

The closure of Polytex Garments Limited resulted in about 7,000 job losses. At the time of writing, most of the workers who lost their jobs were unemployed. Some had gone back to their villages, and some were engaging in informal work. Some workers were hired by other factories, but many of them were again let go of when those factories started downsising due to the challenges of the economic crisis in Sri Lanka and the lack of orders. As per the labour laws, employers are able to let go of workers who are on probation (under six months of service). This unfortunately has been the case for Polytex workers who joined other factories. Another segment of workers was reported to be ‘blacklisted’ in the industry. According to trade unions, these were the office bearers and key members of the Polytex trade union, who were involved in the protests. A manufacturers association commented these were the workers who obstructed the proceedings and prevented the continuation of the business and the potential continuation of employment for workers. In addition, as confirmed by an employers association, compensation of 200 workers was pending as of June 2023 due to these workers having taken legal action against Polytex.

Left: Protests conducted by workers in December 2021 outside the Ekala factory. Right: Organising the protests with leaflets distributed to workers outside factory gates in Ekala. 

The closure of Polytex factories took place just as the country was emerging from the pandemic. The closure also happened in the middle of the worst economic crisis the country faced since its independence from the British Empire 70 years ago. The inflation had skyrocketed with cost of living increasing by 200% or more. At the time of the closure, garment workers were facing a rapid rise of the cost of essential goods, shortages of electricity, shortages of food, medicine, and other necessities, and a declining value of the national currency. Loss of employment in this current economic crisis had plunged Polytex workers out of the frying pan into the fire. According to the Union, two workers have already committed suicide due to the loss of income. This information however is not verified and nor published elsewhere. 

Trade sanctions and increased vulnerabilities of disadvantaged communities

Sanctions are increasingly becoming the weapon of choice to enforce US foreign policy goals, from countering terrorism, battling drug trafficking, to countering human rights violations. In a fully integrated global economy however, the effects of such sanctions are not limited to the targeted countries, individuals, or governments. More often than not, the worst affected groups of such sanctions are people who already live under precarious conditions. Ironically, in cases such as of the current example, trade sanctions imposed to prevent alleged violations of human rights in one country have resulted in erosion of livelihoods and social welfare standards in another. 

The trickle-down effects of trade sanctions in global supply chains are thus varied and complex. It is important to have a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of unilateral economic sanctions, not just for the nations such sanctions are enforced on, but also on the economies and people, who are inter-linked and integrated into these supply chains and are at the risk of being affected by such sanctions. The effects of such sanctions linger long after they are lifted because it is hard to recover from the loss of business and livelihoods. Businesses lost today for the Sri Lankan apparel industry due to the closure of five large scale factories means lower exports revenue at a time when the country is devastated by an economic crisis. Income lost today means thousands of workers are plunged below the poverty line, unable to provide for their families and growing children. Such losses – both human and economic – are difficult to reverse. While it is not clear whether the sanctions will have the intended effects on forced labour in the Xinjiang region, the sanctions have had unintended effects on the lives of labour along the apparel global supply chain as shown with the closure of Polytex Garments Limited in Sri Lanka. 


Shyamain Wickramasingha is a Research Fellow at the University of Sussex Business School, and a Visiting Fellow at CBDS, within the Department of Management, Society and Communication at Copenhagen Business School. Her work focuses on the political economy of global production networks with an emphasis on inter-firm relations, uneven development, and labour regimes. 

Development Finance Institutions: Exploring Their Complex Organizational Identity

13 June 2023

By Suhyon Oh

My PhD journey was driven by questions I had been asking since I worked as a practitioner and witnessed a new phenomenon in the development cooperation community at the time. And it was precisely after 2015, when the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted, that global norms expanded to emphasize that finance is an essential enabler for achieving sustainable development. Around this time, development finance institutions began to emerge as key actors that could fill the trillion-dollar financing gap.

Who are development finance institutions? different thoughts

Development finance institutions (DFIs) are specialized development organizations, mainly owned by national governments, that invest in private sector projects in low- and middle-income countries to promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth. They are not new organizations, but their emergence in the development community is a new phenomenon.

Since the rise of DFIs to prominence, interestingly, there has been a dichotomous understanding of this phenomenon among academics and practitioners. While donor governments and international organizations like the UN, World Bank, and OECD disseminate the relevance of DFIs in reaching the SDGs through research publications, conferences, and seminars, scholars in the field have expressed concern about this phenomenon, viewing it as the financialization of development. They were concerned about the replacement of development assistance with investments by DFIs and, in particular, that DFIs may harm local communities by de-risking commercial investors and helping them earn high returns rather than reaching people in need.

Understanding DFIs’ complex identities is critical

Such a dichotomous view of DFIs originates from the hybrid nature of these organizations. The concept of a hybrid, which in a biological sense refers to the offspring of two plants or animals of different species or varieties, has also been applied in organizational research.

Hybrid organizations are organizations whose identity is composed of two or more types that would not normally be expected to go together. DFIs can be viewed as hybrid organizations because they are both development agencies in the sense that they are required to deliver development outcomes and commercial investors in the sense that they are required to guarantee a certain return on commercial terms.

DFIs have recently begun identifying themselves as impact investors in order to position themselves as hybrid organizations that combine these commercial goals with positive socio-environmental goals. What cannot be overlooked, however, is that in addition to these two purposes, DFIs are owned by government entities and represent government interests, adding another layer of complexity that distinguishes them from impact investors. In addition, each country’s DFIs have different ownership, government ministries, and funding sources, so there are also different levels of heterogeneity amongst DFIs.

This hybrid nature of DFIs can inherently lead to tensions or dilemmas as points of conflict arise between the interests of different objectives. For example, investing in the poorest countries may have higher development outcomes than investing in middle-income countries, but it’s riskier, so in order to lower investment risk and achieve returns, DFIs may want to invest more in middle-income countries.

What we need to know more about DFIs

What’s more, the dilemma of this hybridization of DFI is amplified by DFIs’ recent role in raising capital in cooperation with institutional investors and private equity firms, which were not previously major players in development finance but have increasingly engaged with DFIs to co-invest with them. The increasing popularity of blending public money with private finance accelerates DFIs’ hybridity challenge since private co-investors may ask different preferences for risk-adjusted impact and return profiles.

To address the challenges facing DFIs, a common thread among many stakeholders is the need for DFIs to effectively measure and manage their impact. Among the many purposes of DFIs, creating development impact is the one that best describes their raison d’etre, and effective impact measurement and management are essential to creating development impact.

Source: ODI

The challenges of measuring and managing impact due to the heterogeneity of DFIs and alternatives for doing so are also discussed in my publication with Michael Hansen “Why the dual nature of DFIs makes harmonised impact measurement difficult and what can be done about it”, which is a part of a joint publication of the ODI and EDFI, and within it the readers will find a range of essays on DFIs and their impact measurement management.


Suhyon Oh is a Ph.D. fellow at the Department of Management, Society and Communication, currently doing research on blended finance in least-developed countries. Her research interests focus on financing for development agenda, particularly the rising phenomenon that public finance (such as ODA) increasingly blends with private investment in developing countries and exploring their impacts on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises.

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